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WASTE NOT, WANT NOT: THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN
NUCLEAR WASTE FACILITY SITING
-The requirement of conspicuous wastefulness is not commonly
present, consciously, in our canons of taste, but it is none the
less present as a constraining norm selectively shaping and sus-
taining our sense of what is beautiful, and guiding our discrimi-
nation with respect to what may legitimately be approved as
beautiful and what may not.'
Public concern over the safe management, storage, and disposal
of nuclear generated waste has caused many to question the advisa-
bility of increasing the United States' commitment to nuclear power.
Of particular concern is the danger that such wastes may pose to
future generations.2 Many have proposed linking the licensing of
new nuclear powerplants to a convincing demonstration that the
wastes can be safely contained.' While the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC) has declared that the relationship between waste
disposal and reactor licensing is not legally imposed, the Commis-
sion has determined that, as a matter of policy, it will not continue
to license reactors if it does not have reasonable confidence that
nuclear wastes can and will be properly disposed.' Thus, resolution
of the waste disposal problem is vital not only to the health and
safety of the populace, but also to a continued program of nuclear
generated energy.
The dilemma is two-fold in nature-not only must the outstand-
ing technical issues and problems be resolved, i.e., the method of
waste storage, but the equally important institutional issues must
be resolved, i.e., the location of storage facilities.5 Since the two
problems are interrelated, the former will be discussed briefly in
order to lay a foundation for the primary emphasis of this com-
1. T. VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 72 (1898).
2. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP ON NUCLEAR
WASTE MANAGEMENT 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as IRG REPORT]. This is a valid concern
in view of the fact that plutonium requires almost 250,000 years of storage to render it
harmless. Farney, Ominous Problem: What to do with Radioactive Waste, SMITHSONIAN
MAGAZINE 20 (April, 1974). Plutonium is an element of nuclear waste and is so potent
that even implantation of a single particle may be sufficient 'to cause cancer.
Luschbauch & Langham, A Dermal Lesion from Implanted Plutonium, 86 ARCHIVES OF
DERMATOLOGY 121 (Oct. 1962) (cited in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
3. IRG REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
4. Id. at 5-7.
5. Id. at 87.
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ment-the role of the states in the institutional process of nuclear
waste storage and siting.
Technical Nature of the Problem
Nuclear waste falls into four major categories, with the per-
vasiveness of federal regulation varying according to the potential
hazards which each poses to the public.' High-level waste (HLW) is
that which is dangerously radioactive for hundreds and thousands of
years. It results from atomic weapons production, spent fuel repro-
cessing, and the intact fuel assemblies which are discarded after
their useful life in a nuclear reactor.'
Transuranic (TRU) wastes are those that result primarily from
spent fuel processing and the fabrication of plutonium.8 Many of the
problems associated with HLW wastes, including heat generation
and increased temperatures, are absent from TRU, and they are
thus less difficult to handle." However, because of the presence in
TRU wastes of substantial quantities of transuranic radionuclides,
the issues related to their long term containment are identical with
those relating to HLW repositories,'0 and for purposes of this paper
they will be treated as HLW.
Low-level wastes are those that have low, but potentially ha-
zardous, concentrations of radionuclides." They consist primarily of
"contaminated equipment and other materials associated with de-
fense activities, power plant reactor operation, and medical and in-
dustrial activities and research."" They require little or no shielding
and are presently being disposed of by shallow land burial.13
Uranium mine and mill tailings are the residues from uranium
mining and milling operations which contain low concentrations of
naturally occurring radioactive materials. The tailings are generated
in very large quantities and are presently stored at the site of min-
ing and milling operations. 4 Since these mill tailings have been the
subject of special legislation which specifically defines the regula-
6. H. GREEN & M. ZELL, Federal-State Conflict in Nuclear Waste Management:
The Legal Bases, in ENERGY LAW SERVICE 1 (1980).
7. M. NOEL, Nuclear Waste Disposak Is this the Year for an Ultimate Answer,
in ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY CONFERENCE UPDATE 1 (Feb. 15, 1979).
8. IRG REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
9. Id. at 69-70.
10. Id. at 69.
11. Id. at 10.
12. M. NOEL, supra note 7, at 1.
13. IRG REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
14. Id.
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tory relationship of the states to the federal government, 5 discus-
sion of the problems associated with these tailings will not be under-
taken here.
By far, the largest producer of radioactive waste is the nuclear
power industry."8 The fuel for nuclear power plants is contained in
fuel rods situated in the core of the reactor. As the reactor is
operated, these rods gradually accumulate radioactive byproduct.
When this accumulation reaches the point where the fuel can no
longer be efficiently utilized, the rods are removed and replaced,
even though only one to two percent of their energy potential is ex-
hausted. These partially used fuel loads are referred to as spent
fuel.
It was originally contemplated by the government and those
utilities owning nuclear powerplants that this spent fuel would be
sent to reprocessing plants where the unused portion of the fuel
could be retrieved for reuse. The non-reusable portion resulting
from reprocessing is highly toxic for thousands of years and must be
treated as high-level nuclear waste. 8 Since reprocessing also yields
plutonium, which is used in making nuclear weapons, the process is
favored by the military. 9 However, fear of nuclear proliferation led
the Carter administration to suspend reprocessing in April of 1977."1
Thus, since no reprocessing facilities are in current operation,
nuclear power plants are being forced to store their spent fuel rods
"on-site."'" Because the spent fuel pools (SFP's) at reactor sites were
designed under the assumption that on-site storage was to be only a
temporary measure, their available storage space is. quite limited.
Since there currently exists 3,000 metric tons of heavy metal
(MTHM) in the form of spent fuel, and estimates indicate there will
be 77,000 MTHM by the year 2000,12 a problem obviously arises as
15. Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.A. 7901-42
(1978).
16. IRG REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
17. Federal Facilities for Storing Spent Nuclear Fuel-Are They Needed? in
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL (1979) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS I].
18. Id. One such commercial processing plant was operated at West Valley, New
York, from 1966 to 1972. Some 640 metric tons of irradiated fuel was processed there.
In this process, some 612,000 gallons of liquid high-level waste was produced and is
still stored there. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS I, supra note 17, at 13.
19. Id. at 1.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Generic Environmental Impact State-
ment on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel, ES-3
NUREG 0575 (1979) [hereinafter cited as IMPACT STATEMENT].
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to what to do with the spent fuel rods. This problem has been par-
tially solved by "reracking" the spent fuel rods within the SFP's in
order to take advantage of all available space. This procedure has in-
creased capacity by roughly three-fold." As of January, 1979, the
NRC had received applications for modification of SFP's at 65 reac-
tors. 4 However, older reactors are not so susceptible of modifica-
tion, and, in any event, there is an increasing need for away-from-
reactor storage starting in the early to mid-1980's."5
The tentative solution of the Carter administration was to
dispose of spent fuel in the same way that other high-level nuclear
wastes were to be disposed-in mined underground repositories. It
was in connection with this program that salt domes were tentatively
considered as storage facilities. Also under consideration was the
concept of a retrievable surface storage facility. The major problem
with such a repository would lie in developing a reliable method to
remove the heat. Should the heat removal system fail, a "melt-
down" could occur in which radioactive materials, including plutoni-
um, would be released.27
Because the problems surrounding HLW are predominant in the
minds of the public and most authorities, low-level wastes have on
occasion been described as "the forgotten stepchild of nuclear
power."28 Since low-level waste generally is considered to be any
waste that is not HLW or TRU, it covers a wide variety of material
from minimally contaminated articles that could be disposed of more
simply and less expensively, to material that warrants more re-
stricted disposal." While the nation generally has been concerned
with disposing HLW and TRU wastes, a problem has surfaced con-
cerning the lack of space for disposing of low-level wastes. As of
1975, six commercial low-level waste burial sites were licensed to
operate in the United States."0 However, three of these have since
closed permanently, two have closed temporarily, and the sixth has
23. Id. at ES-4.
24. Id. at ES-11.
25. Id. at ES-12.
26. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS I, supra note 17, at 1.
27. ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY OF THE URANIUM FUEL CYCLE G-23 n.18, II.-J.A. (1974)
(cited in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d
633, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
28. THE PROBLEM OF DISPOSING OF NUCLEAR Low-LEVEL WASTE: WHERE Do WE Go
FROM HERE? REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 7 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT TO THE CONGRESS II].
29. Id. at 7-8.
30. Those six sites are located at Beatty, Nevada; Maxey Flats, Kentucky; West
Valley, New York; Hanford, Washington; Sheffield, Illinois; and Barnwell, South
Carolina. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS II, supra note 28, at 3.
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restricted the annual volume of waste it will receive." These recent
site closings have aroused fear that medical services using radioac-
tive materials will have to be halted or reduced because of a lack
of space to dispose of the waste."
Thus, the problems of storing and disposing of both high-level
and low-level radioactive wastes appear to be reaching crisis propor-
tions. Simply put, Americans are producing more radioactive wastes
than they know what to do with. Given the nation's dependence on
the atom for defense, power generation," and domestic purposes,; it
appears unlikely that the amount of wastes generated will be signifi-
cantly reduced. That leaves the alternative of developing a facility
for isolating that nuclear waste. In view of the uncertainties involved in
such a project, and the emotionalism of the issue, it is little wonder
31. In March of 1975, the West Valley site became the first to close as a result of
radioactive water seeping out of two burial trenches. The Maxey Flats burial site ceased
operations in December, 1977, after a 10 cents per pound excise tax was imposed by
the Kentucky legislature. The tax, designed as a contingency against unforeseen prob-
lems, so discouraged use of the site that it could no longer operate. The Sheffield site
exhausted its burial capacity in 1978 and was closed in 1979 when the operator
withdrew his application to expand.
In July, 1979, the Governor of Nevada closed the Beatty site after two incidents
were reported involving trucks bringing waste into the site. The Governor then joined
with the Governors of Washington and South Carolina in writing the NRC to demand
that the rules governing shipment of commercially generated low-level waste be en-
forced. After receiving assurances that a program would be set up to combat shipping
and packaging problems, the Governor reopened the Beatty site in July of 1979.
Despite the NRC assurances, the Governor of Washington closed the Hanford site
after learning of transportation deficiencies similar to those in Nevada. The matter
became more severe when, in the same month, the Governor of Washington again closed
the Beatty site. With those two sites closed, only the Barnwell site in South Carolina
remained as a low-level waste burial ground. Then, on October 31, 1979, the Governor
of South Carolina ordered Barnwell to scale down the amount of waste it would accept
so that by October of 1981 it would bury only one-half as much as it had in 1979.
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS II, supra note 28, at 3-4. Several months before, state officials
had refused to allow two trucks carrying nuclear waste from the Three Mile Island
accident to enter that state. Millard, What Now? The States and Nuclear Power, 10
STATE LEGISLATURES 10 (1979). This limitation on the Barnwell site was of even
greater significance, however, since that site had been receiving about 85% of the low-
level radioactive waste generated in the United States.
Following assurances of appropriate federal action, the Hanford and Beatty sites
reopened in late November of 1979. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS II, supra note 28, at 4.
32. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS II, supra note 28, at 1.
33. Estimates are that nuclear power supplies 13% of the nation's electric power.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN II, V-14 (1979). This volume is one of
a series of reports on the nation's energy policies and programs as required by the
Department of Energy Organization Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-352 (1976).
34. About 25% of the volume of low-level waste is generated by institutions
which use radioactive isotopes to treat or diagnose illness. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS II,
supra note 28, at 1.
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that, since 1976, many states have adopted measures which would
ban nuclear waste disposal facilities, or which would require that
such facilities be subject to legislative approval. 5 However, the
validity of these measures is subject to some doubt in view of the
traditional federal regulation of the nuclear field.
A History of Nuclear Power Regulation
Prior to 1946, the ownership and control of nuclear materials
was vested solely in the federal government, more specifically in the
military." In that year the first Atomic Energy Act was passed. 7
That Act provided for the creatioi. of a civilian agency, the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC), to take jurisdiction over certain aspects
of nuclear power. However, the government still enjoyed an ab-
solute monopoly of title to all fissionable materials and their related
facilities. 8 In 1954 changing conditions required the government to
relax its regulation of nuclear material. 9 To that end, a second
Atomic Energy Act was passed, 4 predicated upon the idea that
"[altomic energy is capable of application for peaceful as well as
military purposes.141 As stated in the statute:
It is therefore declared to be the policy of the United States
that (a) the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall
be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the
general welfare, subject at all times to the paramount objective
of making the maximum contribution to the common defense and
security. 2
The new Act provided a limited role for private industry in the
atomic field. The Commission was empowered to issue licenses for
35. Those states are Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 75-3-302 (1979); Vermont,
VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 10 § 6501 (1973); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN 43 § 689B (1979);
Michigan, MICH STAT. ANN. § 351 (1970); Oregon, OR. R.S. §§ 469, 525 (1953) 325.491;
South Dakota, D. Sess. Laws 283; Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 19-409(d)
(1977); and Louisiana, LA. R.S. 30:1115 (Supp. 1980). Section B. of the Louisiana statute
provides: "Notwithstanding any law, order, or regulation to the contrary, no salt dome
within the jurisdiction of the state of Louisiana shall be utilized as a temporary or per-
manent disposal site for radioactive waste or other radioactive material of any nature
by any person."
36. Miller, A Law is Passed-The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 15 U. CHI. L. REV.
799 (1948)..
37. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-19. For a general discussion of
the Atomic Energy Commission under the 1946 Act, see Newman, The Atomic Energy
Industry: An Experiment in Hybridization, 60 YALE L.J. 1263 (1951).
38. Miller, supra note 36.
39. S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3456.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1976).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2011(a) (1976).
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private control of certain nuclear materials for purposes of commer-
cial power production and medical and technical research.'" While
the states were to maintain power over the generation, sale, and
transmission of power generated by civilian nuclear facilities," title
to the nuclear materials remained with the government.'5
Further, the AEC was vested with exclusive authority to
regulate "source, byproduct, and special nuclear material" in order
to "provide for the common defense and security,' "to protect the
health and safety of the public,"'.7 and because those materials "af-
fect interstate and foreign commerce and must be regulated in the
national interest."" While nowhere is nuclear waste specifically men-
tioned, it has been judicially recognized to be included within the
definition of the phrase "byproduct material."'"
Dissatisfaction with the amorphous state-federal relationship
with respect to source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials
prompted Congress to amend the Act in 1959, adding section 274.10
Designed to provide a careful delineation between federal and state
authority," the new section authorized the Commission, by way of
so-called "turnover" agreements, to surrender to the states its
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133 & 2134 (1976).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976).
45. S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3456.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d) (1976).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d) (1976).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(c) (1976).
49. City of New Britain v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 308 F.2d 648,
649 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (low-level packaged radioactive wastes do constitute byproduct
material); Harris County v. United States, 292 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1961) (high-level
waste is byproduct material within the meaning of the statute). The statute defines
byproduct material as: "(1) any radioactive material (except special nuclear material)
yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of
producing or utilizing special nuclear material and (2) the tailings or wastes produced
by the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium . 42 U.S.C. § 2014(c)
(1976).
The Act further defines the term "source material" to mean "(1) uranium, thorium,
or any other material which is determined by the Commission ... to be source
material; or (2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concen-
trations as the Commission may by regulation determine from time to time." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014(2) (1976). The term "special nuclear material" means "(1) plutonium, uranium
enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the
Commission ... determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include source
material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not
include source material." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa) (1976).
50. Pub. L. No. 68-373, 73 Stat. 688 (1959).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1976). See Murphy & Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium"
Legislation in the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 392 (1976).
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regulatory jurisdiction over those three classes of nuclear
materials."2
For the duration of such an agreement, the state has "authority
to regulate the materials covered by the agreement for the protec-
tion of the public health and safety from radiation hazards."53 Under
section 274(c) the Commission is prohibited from discontinuing its
regulatory authority in certain areas, particularly: "the disposal of
such other byproduct, source, or special nuclear material as the
Commission determines by regulation or order should, because of
the hazards or potential hazards thereof, not be so disposed of with-
out a license from the Commission. 54 However, state regulator au-
thority in non-radiation areas is explicitly preserved by section
274(b), which provides: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to
affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate ac-
tivities for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards.
5
After the addition of section 274, the federal regulatory scheme
remained virtually unchanged until 1974, when the Energy Reorgan-
ization Act abolished the AEC, creating in its stead two agencies
with divided authority.' Responsibility for nuclear research and
development was transferred to the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration (ERDA), 7 and the licensing and regulatory
functions were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC). 8 The duties and authorities of the NRC for control of source,
byproduct, and special nuclear material remain intact as they ex-
isted under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In addition, the NRC is
given specific statutory authority over the licensing and regulation
of:
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976):
The Commission is authorized to enter into agreements with the Governor of any
State providing for discontinuance of the regulatory authority of the Commis-
sion ...with respect to any one or more of the following materials within the
State-
(1) byproduct materials as defined in section 2014(e)(1) of this title;
(2) byproduct materials as defined in section 2014(e)(2) of this title [uranium mill
tailings];
(3) source materials;
(4) special nuclear materials in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(4) (1976).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
56. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-91 (1976).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 101-11 (1976).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-10 (1976). In order to avoid confusion between the AEC and
the NRC, it should be noted that AEC denotes the Commission prior to 1974, and NRC
denotes the Commission after that time.
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(3) facilities used primarily for the receipt and storage of high-
level radioactive wastes resulting from activities licensed under
such [Atomic Energy] Act;
(4) Retrievable Surface Storage Facilities and other facilities
authorized for the express purpose of subsequent long-term
storage of high-level radioactive waste generated by the Ad-
ministration [ERDA], which are not for, or are part of, research
and development activities.5
9
In 1977, the functions of ERDA were transferred to the newly
created Department of Energy (DOE).6 0 Under the new department,
an assistant secretary was given certain nuclear waste management
responsibilities, including:
(A) the establishment of control over existing Government
facilities for the treatment and storage of nuclear wastes . . . ;
(B) the establishment of control over all existing nuclear waste
in the possession . . . of the Government and all commercial
nuclear waste presently stored on other than the site of a licensed
nuclear power electric generating facility, except that nothing in
this paragraph shall alter or affect title to such waste;
(C) the establishment of temporary and permanent facilities for
storage, management, and ultimate disposal of nuclear waste;
(D) the establishment of facilities for the treatment of nuclear
wastes;
(E) the establishment of programs for the treatment, manage-
ment, storage, and disposal of nuclear wastes.'
The Act specifically states that none of the regulatory functions
possessed by the NRC shall be construed as having been transmit-
ted to the DOE.2
In view of this pervasive federal scheme of nuclear material
regulation, questions arise as to the extent to which state legislative
power has been preempted by congressional action in the field and
as to what role, if any, is to be played by the states in future waste
disposal activities.
A Question of Preemption
The doctrine of federal preemption of state authority is founded
59. 42 U.S.C. § 202 (1976). Also created by the 1974 Act is the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation. Located within the NRC, one of its functions is to evaluate
methods of "transporting and storing high-level radioactive wastes to prevent radia-
tion hazards to employees and the general public." § 203(b)(2)(B).
60. Department of Energy Organizaton Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-352 (1976).
61. 42 U.S.C. §7133(a)(8) (1976).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7133(a)(8)(G) (1976).
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upon the supremacy clause of article VI of the Constitution. There is
an initial presumption that "the historic powers of the States [are]
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.""8 This determination is often dif-
ficult, inasmuch as "Itihere is not-and from the very nature of the
problem there cannot be-any rigid formula or rule which can be
used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose
of every act of Congress." 4 Thus, it is the intent of Congress to
preempt which is controlling, and this intent may be express or im-
plied. Preemption is express when Congress has stated that the
statute was intended to be exclusive. If such exclusivity is shown,
"the task of the judiciary ends once it appears that the legislative
measure adopted is relevant or appropriate to the Constitutional
power which Congress exercises.6 15 Preemption is implied when the
field is one of dominant federal interest," when the federal scheme
is so pervasive as to leave the state no room to act, 7 or when the
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."68
The question of preemption of state control over nuclear waste
lies in the interpretation given section 274, the "cornerstone of the
preemption analysis."" This section was designed to prevent any
area of dual or concurrent state and federal control of source, by-
product, or special nuclear material. The Committee71 intended "to
have the material regulated and licensed either by the Commission,
or by the State and local governments, but not by both."7 To this
63. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). That the Burger
Court adheres to this principle is shown by Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117 (1978). The Court rejected commerce clause challenges to a law prohibiting
producers or refiners of petroleum products from operating retail service stations in
Maryland. Writing for a 7-1 majority, Justice Stevens stated:
[W]e do not find that the Commerce Clause, by its own force, pre-empts the field
of retail gas marketing. [Tihis Court has only rarely held that the Commerce
Clause itself pre-empts an entire field from state regulation, and then only when a
lack of national uniformity would impede the flow of interstate goods.
Id. at 128.
64. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1940).
65. Railway Employees' Dept v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 234 (1956).
66. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
67. Id.
68. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
69. H. GREEN & M. ZELL, supra note 6.
70. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Federal-State
Relationships in the Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 290 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as 1959 Hearings] (testimony of AEC Commissioner John S. Graham).
71. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
72. S. REP. No. 86-870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1959J U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2879.
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end, section 274 provides for the partial and conditional turnover of
regulatory power to the states. Before surrendering its authority,
the Commission must determine that the state plan is "compatible"
with the Commission's program and that the state program is ade-
quate to protect health and safety." In enacting these standards, the
Joint Committee emphasized that by "compatible," it was meant
that the radiation standards adopted by the states should be very
nearly "identical" with those of the federal government." For this
reason, the Committee removed the qualification of "to the extent
feasible" which had appeared in the original bill. 5 These determina-
tions present questions of fact for the Commission and give it con-
siderable discretion.
Some commentators feel that the mere fact that Section 274 pro-
vides for federal approval of a state plan is sufficient to indicate
preemption."8 Yet, at the time of the passage of section 274, Robert
Lowenstein, a member of the General Counsel's office of AEC, de-
clined to say that, absent a turnover agreement, state control of
nuclear materials was completely preempted: "Under this . . . we
think it would be fairly apparent ... that there has been an area of
preemption .... [I]t is practically impossible to try to define, taking
into account all of the various gray areas and special circumstances
that might arise, where these areas of preemption should begin or
end."77 Rather, it was felt that the determination of the precise ex-
tent of preemption should be left to the courts."
The notion of preemption is supported, however, by committee
action on the bill. As first introduced, section 274(k) contained a
sentence reading, "It is the intention of this Act that State laws and
regulations concerning the control of radiation hazards from byprod-
uct, source, and special nuclear materials shall not be applicable ex-
cept pursuant to an agreement entered into with the Commission .... " ,7
This sentence was deleted"0 because of the AEC's feeling that
the sentence only stated explicitly what was substantially implicit in
the remainder of the bill.' Thus at least some AEC members felt
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d) (1976).
74. S. REP No. 86-870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2879.
75. Id.
76. Estep & Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards: An Intergovernmental
Relations Problem, 61 MICH. L. REV. 41, 58-59 (1961).
77. 1959 Hearings, supra note 70, at 307 (testimony of Robert Lowenstein).
78. Id. at 308.
79. Id. at 488.
80. S. REP. No. 86-870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2879.
81. 1959 Hearings, supra note 70, at 489 (statement of John A. McCone).
19811 1237
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that state action concerning nuclear materials was expressly pre-
empted absent a Commission agreement to the contrary.82 As stated
by A.R. Luedecke, general manager of the AEC, the sole purpose
for deleting the sentence was "to leave room for the courts to deter-
mine the applicability of particular state laws and regulations deal-
ing with matters on the fringe of the preempted area in light of all
the provisions and purposes of the Atomic Energy Act, rather than
in light of a single sentence." 3
Perhaps an even more significant indication of preemption is
clause (c) of section 274, which provides that no turnover agreement
entered into by the Commission shall provide for discontinuance of
its authority to regulate "the disposal of such other byproduct,
source, or special nuclear material as the Commission determines by
regulation or order should, because of the hazards or potential ha-
zards thereof, not be so disposed of without a license from the Com-
mission."8 Disposal jurisdiction was restricted to the AEC because,
as to such issues, the interstate, national, or international considera-
tions were considered paramount and because the technical safety
considerations were of such complexity that the states could not
adequately deal with them.85 Thus, under the dual justifications of
public policy and public safety, it appears that the federal govern-
ment maintains exclusive authority in the disposal of nuclear waste.
It is in light of this apparent monopoly of power that paragraph
(k) of section 274 looms important. It provides that "[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to affect the authority of any state or
local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards."" Inclusion of this provision negatively
implies that states cannot regulate for purposes of protection from
radiation hazards. Thus, any attempt by a state to regulate waste
disposal must be based on some independent ground. The limits of
82. Id. at 500. (letter from A.R. Luedecke, general manager of AEC, to Chairman
Anderson of the Joint Committee (Aug. 26, 1959)). This view is supported by a later
interpretation by the AEC general counsel as to jurisdiction over nuclear facilities and
materials under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This interpretation declares that "the
individual states may not, in the absence of an agreement with the AEC, regulate the
materials described in the Act from the standpoint of radiological health and safety."
Further, "[tlhe Atomic Energy Act of 1954 had the effect of preempting to the
Federal Government the field of regulation of nuclear facilities and byproduct, source
and special nuclear material." This interpretation is currently regarded as correct by
the NRC. 10 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1980).
83. 1959 Hearings, supra note 70, at 500 (Luedecke letter).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1976).
85. S. REP. No. 86-870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2873-74. However, such things as x-ray machines and thorium, while
presenting dangers, were left to state regulation.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
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state authority are made somewhat obscure because nowhere is the
term "radiation hazards" defined. With respect to location of nuclear
power plants, state courts have upheld state regulations concerning
both the location of a plant at or near an active earthquake fault
zone, 87 and the effects of steam, fog, and icing resulting from opera-
tion of the plant's cooling pond." In neither case did the court con-
sider whether a state could enjoin construction of an AEC-licensed
facility for non-radiological reasons, and the federal courts have not
considered the issue.
Federal courts have spoken, however, with regard to state regu-
lation of radiological hazards. In United States v. City of New York"
the court rejected the notion that section 274 allows states any
degree of regulatory authority based on protection from radiation
hazards. The suit involved a challenge to a New York City ordinance
requiring a city permit before a nuclear power reactor could become
operational. In overturning this ordinance the court expressed the
view that section 274 prohibited any and all state regulation of
radiation hazards associated with power plant operation."
Other state attempts at regulation have likewise fared poorly in
federal courts. In Northern States Power Company v. State of Min-
nesota," the plaintiff power company sought a judgment that the
state lacked authority to regulate waste releases from its Monticello
plant. The Minnesota regulations embraced the same area, but were
substantially more restrictive than those imposed by the AEC. Min-
nesota contended that the regulation of radioactive waste was with-
in the traditional tenth amendment power of the states to protect
and promote the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. Further,
Minnesota argued that subsection (c) of section 274 prohibited only
total relinquishment by the AEC over certain specified activities.2
87. Northern California Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor, Inc. v. Public
Utilities Comm'n, 390 P.2d 200 (Cal. 1964). The court stated:
[Slince the location of an atomic reactor at or near an active earthquake zone
involves safety considerations in addition to radiation hazards, it is clear that the
federal government has not pre-empted the field ...and that the state's powers
in determining the locations of atomic reactors are not limited to matters of zon-
ing or similar local interests other than safety.
Id. at 204.
88. Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975).
While the court held this to be a proper area of state control, it was valid only insofar
as grounded on common law nuisance doctrines.
89. 463 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
90. Id. at 612.
91. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, Minnesota v. Northern States Power Co.,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
92. The specific provision with which Minnesota was concerned was section
274(c)(1), which prohibited surrendering authority with respect to "the construction
1981] 1239
0LOUISIANA LAWREVIEW
According to this view, the concurrent exercise of state control over
nuclear facilities was not forbidden by the Act. In rejecting this
argument, the court stated:
We cannot agree with Minnesota's position that dual control
over atomic power plants and the level of effluents discharged
therefrom is permissible under the Act. While the 1959 amend-
ment does not use the terms "exclusive" or "sole" in describing
existing regulatory responsibilities of the Commission, we think
it abundantly clear that the whole tone of the 1959 amendment,
upon examination of the statutory language alone, demonstrates
Congressional recognition that the AEC at that time possessed
the sole authority to regulate radiation hazards associated with
by-product, source, and special nuclear materials and with pro-
duction and utilization facilities.?
However, since the Act did not expressly 'declare that the
federal government had the sole and exclusive authority to regulate
radiation emissions from nuclear power plants, the court refused to
find express preemption. But the court had no trouble in finding im-
plied preemption based on the pervasiveness of the federal scheme,
the nature of the subject matter, and the legislative history of the
Atomic Energy Act. If states were allowed concurrent regulation of
waste discharges, they might become so overprotective as to "un-
necessarily stultify the industrial development and use of atomic
energy for the production of electric power."'
In Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group95 the
Supreme Court reiterated the reasoning of Northern States. The
issue in Train was whether the discharge of nuclear waste into the
nation's waterways was to be regulated by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA). After a review of the legislative history of FWPCA, the
and operation of any production or utilization facility." 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(1) (1976).
Subsection (c)(4) prohibited relinquishing authority over waste disposal.
93. 447 F.2d at 1149.
94. In addition, as if to echo the AEC's interpretation of the regulatory scheme
(see text and accompanying note at note 74, supra), the court stated:
Finally, we are of the firm opinion that the mere enactment of elaborate and
detailed legislation authorizing turnover agreements to effect a cession to the
states of regulatory authority over some activities associated with radiation
hazards, and specifically prohibiting the relinquishment of authority over others,
in itself evinces an inescapable implication that the federal government possessed
exclusive authority absent the agreements authorized by the 1959 amendment.
447 F.2d at 1150.
95. 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Court held that Congress intended such discharges to be regulated
exclusively under the Atomic Energy Act.9"
Undaunted by these unequivocal expressions of federal preemp-
tion in the nuclear waste management field, the California legisla-
ture enacted section 25524.1 of the Public Resources Code, which
provides that no nuclear fission powerplant shall be permitted land
use in the state until "the commission finds that there has been
developed and that the United States through its authorized agency
has approved and there exists a demonstrated technology or means
for the disposal of high level nuclear waste."97 This provision was at-
tacked by the Pacific Legal Foundation, the "grandaddy of the con-
servative public interest firms,"'" as invading "a field of regulation
which has been preempted by the federal government.""
By couching the regulation in terms of land use, the defendants
sought to justify the statute based on the "other than protection
against radiation hazards" authority left to the states by section 274
(k).' °0 It was argued that this indirect regulation was enacted for the
economic purpose of insuring that "Californians will not have to
bear the financial risk of funding nuclear power plants which may
later be shut down because of inadequate permanent waste disposal
facilities."'' ° In arguing for the validity of this provision, Professor
Tribe emphasized not only the economic aspects of such a regula-
tion, but also the protection from the "anxieties of uncertainty."' '
96. The Court noted that:
Senator Muskie's specific assurance to Senator Pastore that the FWPCA would
not affect existing law as interpreted in Northern States can only be viewed, we
think, as an indication that the exclusive regulatory scheme created by the AEA
for source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials was to remain unaltered.
Id. at 16-17.
97. CAL. [PUBL RES] CODE, § 25524.1 (1976). For an extensive discussion of these
legislative enactments and their relationship to the Atomic Energy Act, see Comment,
Slaying the Nuclear Giants: Is California's New Nuclear Power Plant Siting Legisla-
tion Shielded Against the Attack of Federal Preemption?, 8 PAC. L.J. 741 (1977).
98. Lewin, War of the White Knights, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 24, 1979, 1, at 10. The
group was established in 1973 to combat the environmental groups' litigation blitz of
the west coast. With a total of 18 lawyers and a $2 million budget, the group has been
most active in environmental issues. In addition to bringing a number of suits on
behalf of the nuclear industry, the group has forced the EPA to lift its ban against
DDT spraying in the forests of the Pacific Northwest and has delayed the EPA's plan
to stop Los Angeles from dumping sewage into the ocean.
99. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Develop-
ment Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191, 192 (S.D. Cal. 1979). Appeal dismissed at Ca. 79-3416.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
101. 472 F. Supp. at 198.
102. Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice
Preempted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679, 709 (1979). Professor Tribe's article was an expanded
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He further noted that state regulations for purposes other than pro-
tection from radiation are not preempted if they only incidentally af-
fect federal regulation of nuclear material. Rather, "state re-
quirements not directed at radiation safety would not be duplicative
of federal efforts, and a holding of preemption in such a case would
create a legal vacuum.' ' 3
Despite the forcefulness of this argument, the court found such
"an exceedingly broad interpretation of section [274] (k)" to be un-
warranted. In finding implied preemption, the court expressed fear
that adoption of such reasoning would allow the nullification of ex-
clusive federal regulation by the careful tailoring of state legislative
purposes:
It is scarcely credible that Congress, in enacting section [274] (k),
intended to furnish the States with a means of evading and un-
dermining the NRC's exclusive regulatory authority under sec-
tion [274] (c). Rather, the better inference would seem to be that
Congress envisioned that section [274] (k) would be interpreted
in such a fashion as not to nullify what Congress provided in sec-
tion [274] (c).11'
After a review of the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act,
the court further explained:
In the exercise of its discretion, the NRC has decided not to re-
quire the existence of a technology for the permanent disposal of
nuclear waste as a condition precedent for the construction and
operation of nuclear reactors. The NRC's decision in this regard
falls within the preempted sphere because it relates to, touches
upon and involves the regulation of radiation hazard pertaining
to the construction and operation of nuclear power plants and to
nuclear waste disposal.0 5
Finally, the California regulation was held invalid because it
stood "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.""' It was felt that Congress's
policy of encouraging the development and utilization of nuclear
energy would be decidedly frustrated if all states had similar
statutes. Thus, while the Atomic Energy Act leaves some room for
the states to regulate on the subject of nuclear energy, "the power
to regulate is not the power to prohibit."''0
and revised version of a legal memorandum prepared for the California Assembly Sub-
committee on Energy.
103. Id. at 714.
104. 472 F. Supp. at 198.
105. Id. at 199.
106. Id. at 200, citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
107. 472 F. Supp. at 200.
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Alternative Bases For State Regulation
While it appears from the foregoing that the Atomic Energy Act
precludes direct nuclear waste regulation by the states, it is not
wholly irrelevant to explore alternative bases of indirect regulation
and the legal doctrines affecting them. It must be remembered that
the Act does not preclude state regulation for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards."8 It is difficult to assess the ap-
plication of this provision in the absence of specific state or local
regulations on the subject. Yet, certain areas of potential state
regulation suggest themselves.
The first and foremost of these areas, mentioned in the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy Hearings on Federal-State Relation-
ships, is the field of zoning laws.1" Arguably, a zoning ordinance pro-
hibiting commercial or industrial developments may validly preclude
establishment of a waste disposal facility in the zoned area. Such an
ordinance would not be based on protecting the public from radia-
tion hazards, nor would it specifically discriminate against waste
disposal facilities.
However, several factors militate against the validity of such an
ordinance as applied to a federal facility. Federal regulations require
that any nuclear waste repository be located on federal lands."0
Such lands may be acquired either through mutual agreement or by
condemnation. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides that
if the land is purchased with the consent of the state, then the
federal government will have exclusive jurisdiction over the land."'
Clearly, any local regulations would be inapplicable to facilities so
located."' If the state does not consent to the federal purchase, then
article IV, section 3 governs, and states have jurisdiction over the
property as if owned by a private person. 3 However, this state
power is qualified by the fact that the United States has unlimited
jurisdiction over property acquired for the exercise of its constitu-
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
109. 1959 Hearings (statement of Mr. Hydeman).
110. 10 C.F.R. § 50, App. F (1979).
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. This clause provides that Congress has the
power "To exercise exclusive legislation in all Cases whatsoever . . . over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be,
for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful
buildings."
112. In United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,.868, at 650 (1819), Justice
Storey stated that a fort purchased under article I "was not within the body of any
county of Rhode Island, for the state had no jurisdiction there. It was as to the state as
much a foreign territory, as if it had been occupied by a foreign sovereign." Id. at 653.
113. Engdahl, Federalism and Energy: State and Federal Power Over Federal
Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 296-98 (1976).
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tional powers, regardless of state consent."' As stated in Fort
Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe,"' this qualification is to
prevent states from frustrating the performance of federal constitu-
tional functions."' In such a case, the exercise of exclusive federal
jurisdiction is independent of the doctrine of preemption, and the
state law need not openly conflict with federal law to be required to
yield." '7
Thus it appears that state zoning laws will provide an insuffi-
cient basis for state regulation of waste depositories. Yet, because
waste siting has such broad regional implications, states feel, with
some degree of justification, that they should not be totally precluded
from regulatory control merely because the waste is located on
federal lands."8 A second argument that can be structured on behalf
of valid state regulation is that regulations which only incidentally
affect waste siting would be valid. This argument was seemingly re-
jected in the Pacific Legal Foundation decision;". but in that case,
California was seeking to exercise direct control over nuclear facili-
ties. The provision in question provided that, in the event no demon-
strated technology for waste disposal was developed, fission power-
plants were specifically denied land use in the state."' Such a
statute, which clearly discriminates against nuclear facilities, flies in
the face of federal control. But, if a state exercised an independent,
non-discriminatory mode of regulation based on its inherent police
powers, such regulation might be valid notwithstanding its inciden-
114. Id. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
115. 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
116. "Where, therefore, lands are acquired in any other way by the U.S. within the
limits of a State than by purchase with her consent, they will hold the lands subject to
this qualification: that if on them forts, arsenals, or other public buildings are erected
for the uses of the general government, such buildings, with their appurtenances, as
instrumentalities for the execution of its power, will be free from any such inter-
ference and jurisdiction of the State as would destroy or impair their effective use for
the purposes designed." Id. at 539. Cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (a federal
residential housing project was allowed to be built in a local area zoned for commercial
property). The Berman v. Parker Court stated: "Once the object is within the author-
ity of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is but a means to an end." Id. at 33. Similarly, the
Supreme Court of New York held that the builder of a closed cycle cooling system
need not obtain all local permits and zoning variances. It was reasoned that the
nuclear area had impliedly been preempted and to require a license to acquire local
permits would interfere with federal control. In re Consolidated Edison Co. of New
York, Inc., 2 Nuc. Reg. Rep. (CCH) 20,018 (N.Y. 1975).
117. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
118. Lucas, Nuclear Waste Management: A Challenge to Federalism, 7 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 917, 919 (1979).
119. See text at notes 97-107, supra.
120. See text at note 97, supra.
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tal effect on a nuclear facility. This argument is supported by the
fact that, in passing the AEA, Congress was concerned with dual
regulation. 2 ' A police power regulation based on the "other than
radiation hazards" provision of section 274(k)'" would not be duplica-
tive, and it can be argued that the nullification of such a provision
because of its incidental effects would create-a regulatory void. The
modern principle seems to be that, in view of the potential contribu-
tions of state and local action to the regulation of complex activities,
the state regulations must be permitted to supplement federal ef-
forts, so long as the effectuation of a valid federal purpose is not im-
paired."3
Thus, in Huron Portland Cement Company v. Detroit... the
Court upheld a Detroit ordinance regulating smoke emissions from
ships, despite extensive federal licensing of such ships in interstate
and foreign commerce. The Court found no overlap between the
federal inspection laws (setting safety standards for federal licens-
ing) and local pollution control laws. 25 The former were aimed at
safety; the latter concerned pollution.
Again in 1973 the Supreme Court upheld a California law pro-
hibiting compulsory arbitration in the wage disputes of New York
Stock Exchange employees, despite a contrary Exchange rule en-
acted pursuant to federal securities laws.' 8 The Court gave strong
credence to California's independent policy of protecting wage
earners. Since the state legislation only incidentally affected the
federal goal of investor protection, ' 7 the Court deemed the proper
approach to be to "reconcile 'the operation of both statutory
schemes with one another rather than holding one completely
ousted.' "1.28
Any such state regulatory provision would have to be carefully
tailored, since a court would surely look both to its actual intent and
to the scope of its incidental effects. In the recent case of Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Company," the Court invalidated oil tanker safety
standards adopted by Washington State which were deemed stricter
than those of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. The
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
122. See text at notes 100-103, supra.
123. Tribe, supra note 102, at 687.
124. 352 U.S. 440 (1960).
125. Id. at 446.
126. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
127. Id. at 134-36.
128. Id. at 127, quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 361
(1963).
129. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
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Court found that Congress had entrusted to the Secretary of Trans-
portation the duty of adopting appropriate design standards.13 Since
the two statutes were aimed at precisely the same ends, the federal
judgment that a tanker was safe must "prevail over the contrary
state judgment."13'
The justification for the state regulation argument is strongest,
and the Atlantic Richfield logic arguably does not apply, when state-
owned facilities, such as sewage systems, highways, and streets, are
involved."' For example, while the supremacy clause would prohibit
states from permitting higher radiation exposure levels in highway
transportation, it would not appear to prohibit the application of
lower exposure standards. Arguably, the federal system should be
amenable to states' imposing stricter radiation standards when only
state-owned facilities are involved. 3' If the federal government were
opposed to such standards, it could either condemn the property and
pay a reasonable price, which might be prohibitively expensive, or
find substitutes, which could prove prohibitively troublesome."
Yet the federal government is not without its arsenal of
weapons in this area, particularly with regard to the state's regula-
tion of its highways. The NRC is given complete authority to regu-
late the transportation of source, byproduct, and special nuclear
materials by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. '5 Under this authority,
the NRC licenses, regulates, and sets standards for the shipment,
receipt, and packaging of certain nuclear materials. Pursuant to an
agreement with the NRC, the Department of Transportation regu-
lates carriers in the more traditional safety areas, viz, conditions of
equipment, qualifications of personnel, carrier loading and unloading,
etc."' The Department of Transportation derives further authority
over nuclear materials from the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act,"37 under which the Department is authorized to issue regula-
tions "for the safe transportation in commerce of hazardous materi-
als.""' 8 Under this statute, the Department has issued extensive
regulations dealing with the transportation of nuclear materials."9
130. Id.
131. Id. at 165.
132. Estep & Edelman, supra note 76, at 54.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 57.
135. For example, with respect to special nuclear materials, 42 U.S.C. § 2077(a) pro-
vides: "Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by the Commission ...
no person may transfer or receive in interstate commerce . . . any special nuclear
material."
136. 38 Fed. Reg. 8466 (1973). See 10 C.F.R. § 71 (1979).
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-12 (1976).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (1976).
139. 49 C.F.R. § 178 (1979).
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The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, however, permits a
degree of state regulation. Under the Act, states may impose re-
strictions on harzardous materials transportation provided that the
restrictions are authorized by the Secretary of Transportation.""
Significantly, the states may provide "an equal or greater level
of protection to the public" than is provided by the federal law."' In
so doing, however, the states must walk a tightrope in that such re-
strictions must not unreasonably burden commerce"'
Thus, under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, any
unreasonable state regulation of nuclear waste carriers could be in-
validated by the mere finding of a burden on interstate commerce.
Even absent such a finding, however, permissible state regulation
may be limited by the principle announced in Johnson v. Mary-
land."' In holding that a state's regulation of its instrumentalities is
not absolute, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a post
office employee for driving a truck without a state license. Justice
Holmes stated:
It seems to us that the immunity of the instruments of the
United States from state control in the performance of their
duties extends to a requirement that they desist from perform-
ance until they satisfy a state officer . . . for a necessary part
of them and pay a fee for permission to go on. Such a require-
ment does not merely touch the Government servants remotely
by a general rule of conduct; it lays hold of them in their specific
attempt to obey orders and requires qualifications in addition to
those that the government has pronounced sufficient."'
However, the scope of this immunity was left somewhat unclear:
Of course an employee of the United States does not secure a
general immunity from state law while acting in the course of
his employment .... It very well may be that, when the United
States has not spoken, the subjection to local law would extend
to general rules that might affect incidentally the mode of carry-
ing out the employment ... 
Of course, in the nuclear field, the federal government has spoken,
and one is left to wonder whether its words preclude even an inci-
dental effect on federal activities which arises from state regulation
of wholly-owned instrumentalities.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1811(b) (1976).
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. 254 U.S. 51 (1920).
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Id. (emphasis added).
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A third possible basis for valid state regulation of nuclear waste
is that the federal government could be bound by general state safety
regulations dealing with such matters as electrical wiring, plumbing
and sanitation, structural design and materials, fire prevention, and
safety standards of non-radiation machinery. ' Though such standards
are non-discriminating and may produce only incidental effects, the
validity of their application to a federal nuclear waste facility seems
doubtful. Initially, the nuclear power area may be deemed one of
such dominant federal interest that state and local ordinances are
powerless to impede federal activities. For example, when Congress
sought to secure the comprehensive development of national water
resources and set forth these intentions in the Federal Power Act,' 7
an Iowa statute requiring the granting of a state permit by the
State Executive Council prior to obtaining a federal water license
was deemed tantamount to a state veto and therefore void. It was
reasoned that such a provision would destroy the effectiveness of
the Federal Power Commission." 8 Secondly, such regulations may be
improper for the same reason that zoning provisions may be ques-
tioned, ie., a state is powerless to regulate a federal instrumentality
in the absence of congressional authorization when the federal entity
has been established on federal land and in furtherance of a Consti-
tutional power."9
A final possible method for state regulation of nuclear waste
would be an absolute prohibition upon its importation into the state.
Such a quarantine was upheld in Bowman v. Chicago & North-
western Ry. Company'5' when applied to articles which were not
deemed "legitimate subjects of trade and commerce." The articles
there excluded were those:
[Wihich, on account of their existing condition, would bring in
and spread disease, pestilence, and death, such as rags or other
substances infected with the germs of yellow fever or the virus
of small-pox, or cattle or meat or other provisions that are
diseased or decayed, or otherwise, from their condition and
quality, unfit for human use or consumption."'
This case was relied on by New Jersey'5 2 in defending the validity of
146. Estep & Edelman, supra note 76, at 60.
147. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828 (1976).
148. First Iowa Hydro Elec. Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
149. See text at notes 110-17, supra.
150. 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888).
151. Id. See Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 345 (1933) (upholding New York's law bar-
ring the importation of diseased cattle); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) (pro-
hibiting the importation of decayed or noxious foods).
152. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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a state provision barring importation of "solid or liquid waste which
originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the
State. . . ."' I The state sought to justify its regulation on the basis
that waste was not commerce. In rejecting this plea on commerce
clause grounds, the Court noted that, in saying that innately harm-
ful objects are not legitimate subjects of trade or commerce, the
Bowman Court was stating its conclusion, not the starting point of
its reasoning: "In Bowman, and similar cases, the Court held simply
that because the articles' worth in interstate commerce was far
outweighed by the dangers inhering in their very movement, States
could prohibit their transportation across state lines." '54 Here, there
was no claim that the very movement of the waste endangered
health: "The harms caused by waste are said to arise after its
disposal in landfill sites, and at that point, as New Jersey concedes,
there is no basis to distinguish out-of-state waste from domestic
waste."'55 Following this reasoning, a state ban on nuclear waste
importation could be upheld only if the state alleged that transporta-
tion endangered the populace, an issue considered above, or if the
state had no waste currently within its borders. In either event, it
must still be found that the articles' worth in interstate commerce
was far outweighted by the dangers inhering in their very move-
ment. The definition given to "worth in interstate commerce" would
probably not be the intrinsic worth of the waste itself, but rather
the value to general commerce of storing its nuclear waste and thus
of keeping nuclear power plants in operation. It therefore appears
that there is little in the way of vindication for state quarantine pro-
visions dealing with nuclear waste.
In each of these instances, the validity of state regulation of
nuclear repositories seems unlikely, whether the federal rejoinder
be preemption, intergovernfnental immunity, dominant federal inter-
est, or the commerce clause. But in reviewing such state regulations,
three factors should be noted. The first is that Congress adopted
section 122 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.'" That section
transfers from the NRC to the EPA, and to some extent, to the states,
the authority to set air quality standards, emission levels, and con-
trol requirements for radioactive air pollutants to protect the public
health. In exercising this authority, the states may set standards
more stringent than federal standards, and when federal standards
have not been set, the state may establish any standards it deems
153. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (1979).
154. 437 U.S. at 622.
155. Id. at 629.
156. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7422 (1978).
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appropriate.157 This is significant for two reasons. First, it indicates
that Congress may be willing to tolerate a degree of dual regulation
in the nuclear field. Second, it demonstrates that Congress is not
totally opposed to allowing states to regulate nuclear materials from
the standpoint of protection from radiation hazards.'58
The second factor is that even though states may not be able to
legally regulate nuclear waste storage, as a practical matter the ,y
may do so. That is, by enacting regulatory provisions and by engag-
ing in protracted legal battles as to their validity, the states may
delay waste storage to the extent that the federal government must
make concessions to state interests. Finally, in seeking to support
any of their regulatory interests, the states may advance the argu-
ment that, even though the federal government has sought to
assume full responsibility for waste storage, by failing to reach a
solution to the problem, the federal government has surrendered
the right to exclusive regulation. This is a novel argument, but not
without some merit. The problem is growing increasingly serious,
and in the event of future failure on the part of the federal govern-
ment to reach a decision, the states may be justified in acting on
their own." 9 Fear of just such an argument may, in part, be respon-
sible for the recent bevy of federal activity in the nuclear waste
management field.
Recent Government Actions on Nuclear Waste Storage
After taking office in January of 1977, President Carter took
several steps to address major nuclear issues. As a part of his Na-
tional Energy Plan, he ordered a review of the United States' nuclear
waste management program. This led to the creation of an internal
Department of Energy task force. That task force carried out the
review and in February of 1978 published a draft report expressing
preliminary views on key waste management issues."e That report
157. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee on Conference, H.R. REP. No.
564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1977). Thus, the holding of the Northern States decision
was legislatively negated.
158. As Professor Tribe points out, while this is the first explicit manifestation of
congressional intent that the states may regulate for such a purpose, it does not
necessarily mean that such manifestation is required. The "clear statement rule"
requires a clear showing of congressional intent that states may not regulate for such
a purpose. Tribe, supra note 102, at 699 n.105.
159. It should be noted, however, that such an argument would justify only a
state's regulation of nuclear waste within its borders, not prohibition of storage within
its borders. Presumably, capacity for the latter is what most states seek.
160. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, DIRECTORATE OF ENERGY RESEARCH;
DRAFT REPORT OF TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT;
FEBRUARY 1978.
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recommended the creation of a federal waste management program
which reflected the views not only of all involved government agen-
cies, but also of the Congress, the states, local government, indus-
try, the scientific and technical community, and the public."' In
response to these findings, on March 13, 1978, the President estab-
lished the Interagency Review Group (IRG), composed of repre-
sentatives from fourteen governmental entities."2 Its duty was to
formulate, by October 1, 1978, recommendations for the establish-
ment of a comprehensive policy towards long-term management of
nuclear wastes.1
63
On February 12, 1980, after a review of the IRG findings, the
President announced a comprehensive program aimed at manage-
ment of all types of nuclear waste.16 ' As the first point of a seven-
point program, the President announced a commitment to provide
an effective role for state and local governments in the implementa-
tion of the plan." 5 This step included three actions: first, the
161. IRG REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
162. These government entities included the Department of Energy, the Depart-
ment of State, the Department of Interior, and Department of Transportation, the
Department of Commerce, NASA, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, EPA,
the Office of Management and Budget, the Council on Environmental Quality, the
Office of Science and Technology, the Office of Domestic Affairs and Policy, the
National Security Council and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The NRC par-
ticipated as a non-voting member.
163. IRG REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
164. President's Message to Congress Transmitting a Radioactive Waste Manage-
ment Program, 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 296 (Feb. 12, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
Message to Congress].
165. Id. at 297. The remaining six points are: second, the establishment of an
interim planning strategy focusing on the use of mined geologic repositories capable of
accepting waste from both reprocessed and unreprocessed commercial spent fuel. The
plan calls for selection of the site by 1985 and the beginning of operation by 1990. Also
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, a project for the unlicensed disposal of transuranic
waste from the national defense program, is cancelled.
Third, the federal government is directed to maintain interim storage of defense
waste, while utilities are directed to maintain interim storage of commercial nuclear
waste. However, a limited amount of government storage capacity is to be provided
for those utilities unable to expand their storage capabilities.
Fourth, the DOE is directed to work jointly with states, government agencies,
industry, other organizations, and the public to develop a plan for regional disposal
sites for commercial low-level wastes.
Fifth, the authority of NRC to license disposal of high-level waste and low-level
waste in commercial facilities is extended to include the disposal of transuranic waste
and non-defense low-level waste in new government facilities.
Sixth, all departments and agencies involved in the program are directed to
develop and improve mechanisms for public participation. The program is to be carried
out in full compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act.
Seventh, a commitment is made to encourage and support the bilateral and
multilateral efforts to advance the technical capabilities and understanding of spent
fuel and waste management programs. Id. at 298-300.
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issuance of an executive order pursuant to the Federal Advisory
Committee Act,16 creating a State Planning Council.167 Composed of
nineteen members, the Council is designed to advise the executive
branch and to work with the Congress to address such radioactive
waste management issues as planning and siting, construction, and
operation of facilities.'" Second, the President announced that the
program was to be based on the principle of consultation and concur-
rence with the states. 9 Finally, the Secretary of Energy was
directed to provide financial and technical assistance to the states to
facilitate full participation in review and licensing proceedings. 7 '
State. consultation and concurrence, if taken to its logical
extreme, would imply a state veto power over any unsatisfactory
waste facility siting. Yet, in explaining the principle, the release
says only that "[u]nder the framework of consultation and concur-
rence, a host State will have a continuing role in Federal decision-
making . .".1."7 This statement implies that all decisions will be
federal decisions, with states only able to voice an opinion. At its
fifth meeting, the State Planning Council expounded on what it saw
as the proper procedure for consultation and concurrence. The coun-
cil recommended a conflict resolution mechanism based on an incre-
mental decisionmaking process which would lead to a "growing con-
sensus" on public health, safety, and technical issues.'72 In addition,
the process should involve a neutral and expert third party
agreeable to both sides.1" In the event that a state's objections
could not be resolved in a mutually satisfactory manner, the council
recommended that an explicit presidential determination and affir-
mative action by both houses of Congress be required to override
those objectives.'
While the State Planning Council is only advisory in nature, its
mere creation, as well as its substantive recommendations, gives
great legitimacy to the positions of the states. It is quite probable
that the role of the states will be legitimized in a much more formal
way by the Congress. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, introduced in
the first session of the 96th Congress by Senator Johnston, sought
166. 5 U.S.C.A. App. I §§ 1-15 (1978).
167. Message to the Congress, supra note 164, at 297.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 298.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. DOCKET BOOK TO THE STATE PLANNING COUNCIL ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE
MANAGEMENT, ADDENDUM 70 (1981).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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to mandate a federal program for nuclear waste storage.' As
originally introduced, the bill was silent on the role of state and
local governments in the waste facility siting process. Yet over half
of the committee hearing time was devoted to the issue of consulta-
tion and concurrence.' 8 When it finally reached the Senate floor, the
bill was still silent in this regard."" But the first major amendment
to the bill dealt directly with state concerns. Senator Glenn offered
amendment 1499 to the bill.'78 Title VII of the amendment provides
for the creation of an advisory committee, to be known as the State
Planning Council on Nuclear Waste. 7' The functions of the Council
are to recommend mechanisms for timely and effective involvement
of state and local governments, to ensure that the plan adequately
addresses the needs of the state and local areas affected, and to
advise on all aspects of nuclear waste facility siting. 8' Title IX of the
amendment directs the secretary of the DOE to identify and notify
all states with one or more potentially acceptable sites for a waste
repository. Each affected state is to be given the right to participate
in a process of consultation and concurrence, based on health and
safety concerns, in all aspects of planning, siting, development, con-
struction, and operation of a repository. By consultation and concur-
rence it is meant that the secretary of the DOE shall keep the state
fully and currently informed about any aspects of the project con-
cerning health and safety, shall solicit and receive all objections of
the State Repository Review Panel, 8 ' and shall work diligently and
cooperatively to resolve such concerns and objections.'82 The views
of such panel are to be incorporated into the Repository Develop-
ment Report and submitted to the Congress prior to the beginning
of construction. Unless and until Congress adopts a concurrent reso-
lution stating that the Repository Development Report fully ad-
dresses state and local concerns, no construction license will issue.183
175. Nuclear Waste Policy Act, S.685, reprinted in NUCLEAR WASTE AND FACILITY
SITING POLICY HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
UNITED STATES SENATE, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-30 (1979).
176. Id. at 40-286.
177. See 126 CONG. REC. S. 9970 (daily ed. July 28, 1980) (remarks of tle Presiding
Officer).
178. 126 CONG. REC. 9981 (daily ed. July 28, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Glenn).
179. The Council was to be composed of eight governors, five state and local offi-
cials, a tribal government representative, and the Secretaries of Energy, Interior,
Transportation, and EPA. Id. at 9982.
180. Id.
181. The State Repository Review Panel was created by Title X of the Amendment.
Essentially, such panels are defined as any organization, task force, council, committee,
or other body established by state law to represent such state in its relations with the
federal government concerning nuclear waste repositories. Id. at 9885.
182. Id. at 9983-85.
183. Id. at 9983.
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Before a vote on the Glenn amendment, Senator Johnston sub-
mitted an amendment in the nature of a substitute. "' The Johnston
substitute essentially adopted all of the provisions of the Glenn
amendment except the concurrent resolution procedure. Under the
Johnston proposal, the Repository Review Panel is entitled to sub-
mit its objections to the proposed site to the Congress. No construc-
tion is to begin on the waste facility if, during the sixty-day con-
tinuous session after submission of the objections, one or both
houses of Congress pass a resolution stating that the report does
not adequately address state and local concerns with respect to the
storage of civilian and military wastes respectively.' The change
from the positive to the negative adoption of a resolution by Con-
gress is intended to deal with a situation involving a totally recalci-
trant state that refuses to enter into negotiations.88 The amendment
was subsequently agreed to unanimously. 8" Two days later, the entire
bill passed the Senate by a vote of 88-7."'
The House passed a markedly different bill from the Senate ver-
sion. 88 The House bill provided for burying wastes permanently in
geologic formations and set a timetable for selecting sites. During
debate on the bill, sponsored by Representatives Udall and Dingell,
a bitter debate broke out over states' rights.' An amendment, offered
by Mr. Kostmayer, which would have given states an absolute veto
power over waste storage within their borders, was eventually
defeated by a vote of 161-218."' As passed, the House bill allows an
affected state to veto a waste site, although that veto would not
184. 124 CONG. REC. 10007 (daily ed. July 28, 1980) (remarks of Senator Johnston).
185. Id. at 10008.
186. Id. at 10009.
187. 126 CONG. REC. 10009 (daily ed. July 28, 1980). As further evidence of the con-
cern of the states in the nuclear waste management field, Senator Long read into the
Congressional Record the "Principles of Understanding" between the State of Loui-
siana and the Department of Energy. The agreement provided that in return for con-
cession on the part of Louisiana allowing the establishment of the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve in the state, the federal government agreed not to store nuclear wastes in
Louisiana without the state's permission. Section 8 of the 10 point plan stipulated: The
Department of Energy will not construct any nuclear waste repository for long-term
disposal in Louisiana if the state objects. Studies of possible areas in Louisiana as well
as in other states would continue with some test drilling which will always be preceded by
complete discussion with state officials. 126 CONG. REC. 10002 (daily ed. July 28, 1980)
(remarks of Sen. Long.).
188. 126 CONG. REC. 10266 (daily ed. July 30, 1980).
189. The bill, H.R. 8378, entitled the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, is reprinted at 126
CONG. REC. 11749-53 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). It passed the House by voice vote at 126
CONG. REC. 11768 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
190. 126 CONG. REC. 11756-68 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
191. The text of the amendment is present at 129 CONG. REC. 11756, and the vote is
found at 129 CONG. REC. 11768 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
1254 [Vol. 41
COMMENTS
stand or be implemented unless either the House or Senate
approved it.'92 Thus, in terms of state consultation and concurrence,
the House bill is very similar to the Senate version in that a state's
objections must be ratified by Congress. Yet the remaining dif-
ferences in the two bills were too great to be reconciled in the
remaining days of the 96th Congress. One would suppose that when
the matter is taken up in the 97th Congress, the solution with
regard to the states will approximate that achieved in the previous
session.
Conclusion
Nuclear waste management is a federal responsibility which, if
not solved, will constitute a failure of national leadership. Yet the
wide-ranging implications of nuclear waste storage necessitate that
the concerns of state and local governments be given adequate con-
sideration. To give these parochial concerns too much weight,
however, would be to take the ability to solve the problems out of
the hands of the federal government and to place it with officials
who have no responsibility for that national problem. To give these
considerations too little concern would violate fundamental notions
of federalism. It could further provoke the states into engaging in
extended legal battles which would only confound the problem. Both
versions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act seem to strike a reason-
able compromise, insuring that adequate notice is given to local con-
cerns, while at the same time leaving the ultimate decision in the
hands of elected officials representing both national and local inter-
ests. It is hoped that the issues surrounding nuclear waste storage,
and the role of the states therein, will soon be resolved.
Daryl H. Owen
192. See note 189, supra.
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